Russia's impressive growth record since 2000 may be a "flash in the pan" because high oil prices enable the government to engage in rent-seeking. We document that the Russian crude oil pipeline is a potentially massive source of rents and we use detailed shipping data to check for whether the Russian federal government extracts rent from it. We find that by 2005 the Russian federal government uses cost-based criterion including company-level transport costs, production costs and productivity to determine the allocation of export routes on the crude-oil pipeline. Moreover, federal ownership positions in companies are more important determinants export access at the beginning of the Putin regime in 1999. Thus, by 2005 the Russian federal government appears to be controlling its rent-seeking activities. These results suggest the recent Russian growth may be sustainable.
Introduction
Since 2000, real GDP in Russia has grown at impressive annual average rate of 6.8% (UN Statistics Division, 2007) . This growth record is illustrated in Figure 1 . Desai (2006) provides compelling evidence that these high oil prices have driven a surge in export revenues that accounts for a large share of the growth since 2000. This relationship between oil prices and growth is illustrated in Figure 2 : here, world spot market prices for Russian oil bottom out in 1998 and per capita GDP bottoms out in 1999; both series grow and exhibit some co-movement during the period 1999-2005.
High oil prices are problematic for two inter-related reasons. First, the tax revenue from oil exports enables the Russian government to delay deep structural reforms that are necessary for sustainable growth (see Berglöf, et al, 2003) . And, secondly, the easy money associated with high oil prices can create opportunities for rent seeking. 1 Thus, Russia's may be a "flash in the pan", i.e., just fortuitous due to the dramatic increase in oil prices which may be reversed.
In this paper we document that the Russian federal government's near monopoly control over the crude oil pipeline is a massive source of potential rents. We then use detailed export shipping data during 1999-2005 to test for whether the Russian federal government has used its control over the oil pipeline responsibly or to extract rents. We find that by 2005 the Russian federal government uses cost-based criterion including company-level transport costs, production costs and productivity to determine the allocation of export routes. Moreover, federal ownership positions in companies are more important determinants export access at the beginning of the Putin regime in 1999. Thus, by 2005 the Russian federal government has managed curtail its rent-seeking activities.
These results provide some support for the view that Russia's recent growth surge is sustainable Over 95% of total crude exports from Russia are transported through a system of trunk pipelines. The system is state-owned and operated by a 100% federally-owned company, Transneft 2 . This export system is capacity constrained; moreover there are relatively cheap routes, for example, those terminating in the Russian Black Sea ports, and there are relatively expensive routes, for example, those requiring trans-shipment across second or third countries such Belarus and the Ukraine. Moreover, the export price of crude oil is typically higher than the domestic price. Thus, the federal government can use its control over the oil export pipeline to extract rents.
To determine whether or not the government uses the pipeline to extract rents, we use the theoretical analysis of "hold up" and privatization developed by Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) . 3 This theory, when applied to institutional setting of the Russian crude oil sector, predicts that the way in which the government allocates access to export routes depends upon its ownership positions within that company. The government can use its control over access to the pipeline to hold up any company. When the government imposes quotas on enterprises over which it has substantial cash flow rights, it must also bear the financial costs of this diversion of oil from lucrative world markets. This implies that a rent-seeking government is more likely to impose costly regulation on companies owned largely by outside investors and regional governments. However, a government that uses its control responsibly employs cost-based criterion such as distance to port, company-level productivity and production costs to determine access to particular routes.
To measure federal ownership, we categorize oil companies into state-influence companies that have a substantial federal government presence on their board, and stateindependents that do not have a federal presence on their board. 4 The federal government is engaged in rent-seeking when it provides preferential access to export routes to stateinfluence companies. And, the federal government is an efficient regulator when it provides no preferential access, and access to routes is based on a company's production costs, distance to destination and productivity.
We find that in 2003 state-independent companies had to be much more productive than state-influence companies to receive comparable access to world markets; stateinfluence companies had preferential access to all the export routes; and, the allocation of route capacity was sensitive to production and transport costs only in the state-influence sector. However, by 2005 there is no noticeable discrimination between state-independent and state-influence companies and the allocation of routes is based on company level costs and productivity. Thus, the Russian federal government clearly used it control over the pipeline responsibly by 2005. It is arguable that other rent-seeking methods were used in the oil sector such as direct bribes in 2005. We argue that this interpretation is not plausible since Transneft's ratings by international credit rating agencies improved during [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , and these rating in part account for transparency and corruption.
Our conclusions are controversial because there is evidence that the Putin administration has used its oil pipeline network as a weapon of political and economic 4 See section 2.1 for a comparison of our company classification scheme with the influential scheme developed by Guriev and Rachinsky (2005 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next Section describes the evolution of ownership and structure in the Russian oil sector; Section 3 describes how the federal government controls oil transport then uses this institutional information to generate predictions about how a rent-seeking government would allocate access to the pipeline; Section 5 tests our theory and Section 6 concludes. 
Ownership and Structure
This section describes ownership trends and structural dynamics in Russia's crude oil sector based on state shares and federal government representation on company boards. We develop the distinction between state-independent and state-influence companies that is critical for our empirical work and provide some background on the evolution of the crude oil sector.
Ownership. Privatization of the oil sector was regulated by Presidential
Ordinance #1403 approved on November 17, 1992 (President of Russian Federation, 1992). Vertically-integrated companies, for herein denoted "mothers" according to the Russian terminology, were created by joining some oil-producing enterprises and refineries into open-stock companies 6 . The shares of the newly-created mothers were distributed through several complex and frequently nontransparent auctions. The insiders who were allowed to participate in the bidding gained control over mothers with huge potential value in exchange for relatively small cash amounts (Megginson, 2005 6 An open-stock company publicly trades its shares; a closed-stock company distributes its shares through closed subscription based on the decisions of the company's founders. Table 1 ) and companies where regional governments had substantial ownership (denoted as R in Table 1 ). In 1997 only four of the thirteen mothers were fully owned by outside investors, seven companies were either fully or partially owned by the federal government and two were owned by regional governments (the Republic of Tatarstan owned 30% of Tatneft and the Republic of Bashkortostan owned 63% of Bashneft).
By 1999 the federal government had managed to preserve its significant ownership positions in several companies and placed its representative on these companies' boards. In most of the cases, the federal government representatives were from the agencies that oversaw the oil sector. For example, LUKoil's board of 1999
included the Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy, which at the time was responsible for allocating pipeline capacity for exports. Another member of the Board was the top manager of the State Antimonopoly Committee.
The regional governments also had influence on decisions of several mothers including Bashneft and Tatneft. However, we found no evidence that these regional governments had connection to the federal agencies that supervised the oil sector.
Moreover, the regional governments in these Republics were highly independent and often pursued policies that conflicted with federal rules (see Treisman, 1999 Because shipping routes are highly differentiated by transport costs and the federal government can assign these routes, the government has leverage over the oil producers.
Russian crude is exported through ports and the pipeline sub-system called Druzhba that delivers oil directly to European refineries (see Suppose Transneft allocates export capacity, Q, in the form of access to a pipeline route to a company. In turn, the company chooses the share of its oil output that it exports on world markets and the share that goes to the domestic/CIS market. The world price exceeds the domestic/CIS price: P w > P d since world prices are usually higher and many domestic and CIS refineries delay or simply withhold payments while this is not an issue on world markets. Formally, a company solves
is a concave production function, α is the share of output that is exported on world markets, and (1-α) is the share shipped to the domestic-CIS market. The parameter β captures ownership; when β is close to unity the company is a state-independent, otherwise it is a state-influence company.
When the export quota is non-binding, the company chooses α = 1 and exports all of its output on world markets and chooses L:
If the quota is binding, then Q = α*f(L) and the company sells (1-α*)f(L) on the domestic/CIS market. In this case, the shadow price of the quota is β(P w -P d ), which is the company's simply revenue lost by shifting a unit of output sales from the world to domestic-CIS market, and 
Thus, a marginal increase in private ownership, β, depresses the marginal cost of diverting oil from world markets and thus induces the state to tighten quotas. This implies that a rent-seeking government would use its control over pipeline to discriminate against state-independent companies. If a government promotes efficiency, then private ownership should not matter, but firm level costs should. 11 We take these predictions to the data in what follows.
Data
The data were acquired from Oil Trade, a statistical annex to Oil and Capital, a 
Subsidiary Exports.
These are reported in thousands of tons. 12 In the dataset we included exports of only those subsidiaries of mothers that reported production in 1999, 2003 and 2005, and reported production was higher than reported exports. 
Subsidiary
Productivity. This is measured as output per operating well (we also check for output per well). We would expect this variable to be positively associated with export access when access to world markets is based upon efficiency.
Subsidiary Production Costs.
We use regional producers' price (rubles per ton) as a measure of production costs for a subsidiary located in one of the six oil regions in Russia. If access to world markets is based upon economic criteria, then we would expect that this variable would be negatively associated with exports.
Subsidiary Transportation Costs per
Route. This is measured as the tariff (dollars per 100 ton/km) times the distance from the subsidiary's location to the point of exit onto world markets for a particular route. Tariffs are listed in Table 6 . We use distance in km from a subsidiary to ports or points of exit as a measure of distance from a subsidiary on a particular route. Distance in km was defined by the shortest route from a subsidiary allocation to a port or Russian border (in case of Druzhba) along Transneft thank Michael Cohen from the Office of Energy Markets and End Use, the Department of Energy, for help with this issue. 13 The reason to exclude exporting subsidiaries with no reported production or reported exports higher than production is the possibility that they exported re-distributed oil. Russian mother companies can redistribute their output intended for export between the subsidiaries, i.e., a certain subsidiary may receive additional oil, produced by another subsidiary, for export. This re-distribution does not change the receiving subsidiary's production costs, but affects its transportation costs. Since it is impossible to tell how much extra oil the subsidiary received, the actual costs of the exporting subsidiary are impossible to calculate. There were four exporting subsidiaries that did not report production in 2003 and one subsidiary in 2005. In 1999 and 2003 all of the subsidiaries' exports were lower or equal to the reported production; there was one subsidiary in 2005 that reported higher exports than production.
trunk pipelines.
14 If the allocation of export capacity is related to efficiency considerations, then we would expect to observe a negative association for subsidiaries between export volumes on a particular route and transportation costs. were added (see Figure 3) . 16 Thus, in the dataset we look at the total of four export routes Evidence of preferential treatment and rent-seeking is that state-influence subsidiaries get additional access to most or all of these routes. Table 6 . For
Tuapse-Novorossyisk route we use the average of transshipment costs in two ports. If pipeline access was efficiently allocated, we would expect to observe a negative association between subsidiary-level export volumes and transshipment costs.
14 The location of a subsidiary was approximated either by location of its most productive fields or by location of its office. The information on the most productive fields was taken from mother companies' websites; the office addresses were obtained from the website of the Russian System of Full Information Disclosure and News "Skrin" (http://www.skrin.ru).The data on the pipeline routes location was taken from Transneft's website (www.transneft.ru). To calculate distance between cities where the pipeline nodes are located, we used the AutoTransInfo website (http://www.ati.su/) that provides information on distances between Russian cities and towns along highways. We assume that the oil from a subsidiary enters the pipeline at the node-city that is closest to the location of the subsidiary. 15 As a robustness check, we also use an alternative distance measure. Following Berkowitz (2001), alternative distance is measured in total numbers of Transneft regional sub-systems the subsidiary has to pump its oil through to get to the port or Russia border. The two measures are highly correlated (0.83-0.85) for the three years of interest. 16 number of foreign countries a subsidiary's export oil has to go through before reaching the world market. A priori, the relationship between the export volumes and the number of foreign countries per route is ambiguous: on the one hand it is negative because the more countries oil has to cross, the higher is the possibility of hold-up, so the relationship may be negative; it could also be positive, because the best access to the European energy markets is through Baltic export terminals, two of which (Ventspils and Butinge) are located in the states other than Russia. Again, just how this variable is related to efficiency and rent-seeking is unclear.
Additional controls.
As additional control variables, we use route dummy variables, mother dummy variables and some mother-specific observables.
Empirical Analysis
We first test the prediction that the federal regulatory agencies provide Ideally, we would control for mother-effects and route effects as well as motherspecific observables and route-specific observables. However, we cannot control for all 17 All of our results still if we use total well and output per total number of wells. 
Hypothesis 1
The state-influence subsidiaries do not receive privileged treatment because they cannot ship more than the state-independents if they are less productive (the null is 0 4 = α ).
Hypothesis 2
The state influence subsidiaries are not privileged because they cannot export more than the state-independents if their production costs are higher (the null is ) 0 6 = α . 18 These include at the mother-level the number of operating wells, output per well, the share of idle wells, the change in total wells compared to previous year and the number of new wells in new fields. In Tables 8A and 8B the columns denoted "State-Influence Net of StateIndependent" report the results of our hypothesis tests that there is no preferential treatment. And, the columns entitled "State-Independent" and "State-Influence" present estimates of the associations between our independent variables and oil exports for the subsidiaries of different ownership. In each cell we first report point estimates, standard errors (in parentheses) and then quantitative significance which is the association between a one-standard deviation increase in the independent variable on thousands of tons of oil exports.
Checking column (1) in specifications 1 and 2 for 2003 (Table 8A) , we reject hypothesis 1 that there is no discrimination by subsidiary-productivity per well at the 1 % level. The point estimates provide evidence that state-independent subsidiaries export more on world markets only if they are more productive while productivity does not matter for state-influence subsidiaries.
We fail to reject the hypothesis 2 that the state influence companies are not privileged because of regional production costs in specification 1, but reject this hypothesis at the 10% level in specification 2. However, it is clear from columns (2) and (3) in both specifications that only the state-influence subsidiaries pay attention to regional production costs. A possible explanation for this is state-independents face tighter capacity constraints and will export as much as the federal government allows, while the state-influence companies can be more sensitive to costs.
We reject hypothesis 3 that the state influence subsidiaries do not have preferential access because of transportation costs at the 1 % level in both specifications.
Once again, the estimates in columns (2) and (3) suggest there is a major difference in the treatment of state-independent versus state-influence subsidiaries. For example, the estimates in specification 2 imply that a one standard deviation increase in transportation costs is associated with a 1.7 million ton cut in exports in the state-influence group and a 1.7 million ton increase in the state-independent group. This suggests that when stateinfluence companies reduce their exports following an increase in transportation costs, the state-independents pick up their slack capacity.
We fail to reject hypothesis 4.1 for specification 1 that the state-influence subsidiaries have no preferential access to routes with lower transshipment costs. Both state-influence and state-independent subsidiaries tend to export less on routes with high transshipment costs, and the differential sensitivity of these two groups of subsidiaries is not significant. However, in specification 2 we reject the null at the 1% level that stateinfluence subsidiaries received no preferential access to all routes including Druzhba, Novorosyisk & Tuapse, Primorsk, Butinge, and Odessa. The results show that stateinfluence subsidiaries received drastically better access to ALL the export routes, especially to Baltic ports of Primorsk and Butinge as well as Ukrainian port Odessa.
Thus, there is compelling evidence that in 2003 state-influence companies received preferential access and the government was involved in rent-seeking. Table 8B reports our test results for 2005. It is striking that we now fail to reject the hypotheses in both specifications that state-influence subsidiaries receive no preferential access based on regional costs, productivity (output per operating well) and transportation costs. In specification 1 we fail to reject the hypothesis that state-influence companies get better access to the routes with the lower transshipment cost. And, in specification 2 where we fail to reject the hypothesis for each route that that the stateinfluence and state-independent subsidiaries have equal access. to finance its projects and these ratings measure Transneft's ability to honor its financial commitments. In general, the ratings may vary from the highest mark, AAA, to the lowest, D. Ratings may also be marked by "+" and "-" to denote the intermediate rating categories. In particular, "B" rating indicates that a company has the capacity to meet its financial commitments but is rather vulnerable under unfavorable commercial, financial and economic conditions; "BB" rating indicates that a company is less vulnerable to nonpayment than other speculative issues, however, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions which could lead to its inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitments; "BBB" rating shows that a company exhibits adequate protection parameters, but adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the company to meet its financial commitments 19 . In the S&P reports, it is consistently mentioned that diversification of export Since we lack detailed data on route characteristics in 1999, we estimate the specification in which we control for route dummies and mother observables.
These estimates and test statistics are presented in Table 10 . Column (1) shows that in 1999 there is no discrimination between state-influence and state-independent subsidiaries in terms of regional costs, productivity and transportation costs. Column (2) shows that while productivity (output per operating well) is positively associated with access to the pipeline, regional costs and transportation costs had no significant influence. This suggests that in 1999 efficiency considerations were not used in distributing the available pipeline capacity either. However, by 2005 regional cots and transportation costs have the expected and significant negative association with export access, which suggests that efficiency criterion have become more important over time.
Conclusions
The sustainability of Russia's impressive growth is controversial because of the role of high oil prices. While the analysis in Desai (2006) establishes that there is no Dutch disease, there is a still a concern that high oil prices allow the Russian government to delay restructuring and to engage in rent-seeking. Indeed, the Yukos affair, the growing influence of Gazprom, the growing concentration within the oil sector and episodes where the government has used its control over the pipeline to bully other countries is of concern. Moreover, the Russian federal government owns Transneft, and this enables the government to influence major oil companies on a day to day basis. Our analysis suggests that by 2005 the government has restructured its regulation of oil because it stopped discriminating against state-independents, and because access to export routes was largely determined by costs and company level productivity. Notes: Return on assets (non-current assets) in year is net income at the end of the year t divided by the average value of assets (non-current assets) on December 31 of year t and year t-1. Non-current assets equity include (most importantly) the net value of property, plant and equipment; it also includes equity investees and long-term investments at cost, deferred income tax assets and other long term assets. There are 270 observations and ** denotes significance at the 5-% level and * denotes significance at the 10-% level. Productivity is output per well in per operating wells. The results are robust to using output per total wells. Notes: Results are base on a maximum likelihood estimation of a Tobit model where the dependent variable is censored at zero. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. There are 270 observations and ** denotes significance at the 5-% level and * denotes significance at the 10-% level. Productivity is output per well in per operating wells. The results are robust to using output per total wells. X means that a route is not in operation in a particular year.
